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32 F.Supp.2d 675 
United States District Court, 
S.D. New York. 
Cynthia N. PETERSON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The CITY COLLEGE, The City University of New 
York, Defendants. 
No. 92 Civ. 7952 (DC). 
| 
Jan. 21, 1999. 
Associate professor who was denied tenure brought age 
and sex discrimination action against university. On 
university’s motion for summary judgment, and 
professor’s motion to preclude university from offering 
any defense and for sanctions, the District Court, Chin, J., 
held that: (1) university did not discriminate against 
professor on basis of age or gender; (2) professor had full 
and fair opportunity to conduct discovery; (3) professor 
could not establish claim of retaliation; and (4) university 
would not be sanctioned for alleged discovery violations. 
  
University’s motion granted; professor’s motion denied. 
  
 
 
West Headnotes (7) 
 
 
[1] 
 
Civil Rights 
Motive or intent;  pretext 
 
 Ultimate issue in an employment discrimination 
case is whether the plaintiff has met her burden 
of proving that the adverse employment decision 
was motivated at least in part by an 
impermissible reason, that is, that there was 
discriminatory intent. 
10 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[2] Civil Rights 
 Tenure 
Civil Rights 
Education, employment in 
 
 Although tenure decisions are not immune from 
review under Title VII or the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a 
court should exercise caution in second-guessing 
a tenure decision and should not sit as a super 
tenure-review committee. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 
626(b); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–5. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[3] 
 
Civil Rights 
Education, employment in 
Civil Rights 
Education, employment in 
 
 University did not discriminate against associate 
professor on basis of professor’s gender or age, 
in violation of Title VII or the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 
even if professor was more qualified than her 
colleagues and there were some minor 
irregularities in her tenure review, in view of 
university’s legitimate non-discriminatory 
reasons for denying tenure, namely, professor’s 
weakness in areas of scholarly work and 
academic publication. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 
626(b); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, as 
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–5. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[4] 
 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Time for consideration of motion 
 
 Associate professor was afforded full and fair 
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opportunity to conduct discovery, which was 
thus sufficient to grant university’s motion for 
summary judgment in professor’s action 
alleging age and gender discrimination, where 
professor had five years to conduct discovery, 
university substantially complied with discovery 
obligations, and professor could not complain in 
any event absent evidence that she conducted 
any depositions. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(f), 
28 U.S.C.A. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[5] 
 
Labor and Employment 
Exercise of Rights or Duties;  Retaliation 
 
 To prevail on a claim that adverse employment 
action was result of retaliation, plaintiff must 
demonstrate that: (1) she was engaged in 
protected activity; (2) defendants were aware of 
the activity; (3) defendants took some adverse 
employment action against her; and (4) a causal 
connection exists between her participation in a 
protected activity and the adverse employment 
action. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[6] 
 
Education 
Exercise of rights;  retaliation 
Public Employment 
Causal connection;  temporal proximity 
 
 University’s denial of associate professor’s 
tenure application was not result of retaliation 
for professor’s participation in discrimination 
lawsuit and other conduct protesting 
discrimination, absent more than conclusory 
allegations as to professor’s protected activities 
and claim that such activities caused denial of 
tenure, particularly in view of university’s 
concrete showing that professor was denied 
tenure for legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reasons. 
1 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[7] 
 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Failure to Comply;  Sanctions 
 
 Defendant university would not be sanctioned 
for failing to produce documents sought by 
plaintiff professor, in action alleging age and 
gender discrimination, where university 
represented that all requested documents had 
been subject of diligent search, that all located 
documents had been produced, and that 
university had not destroyed or refused to 
produce documents, and plaintiff had apparently 
not examined all documents that were made 
available. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*676 Anthony Feldmesser, New York City, Legal Aid 
Services for the Elderly, by Jonathan A. Weiss, New York 
City, for plaintiff. 
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, 
by Judith T. Kramer, Assistant Attorney General, New 
York City. 
 
 
OPINION 
CHIN, District Judge. 
 
In this case, plaintiff Cynthia N. Peterson alleges that 
defendants The City College of the City of New York 
(“City College”) and The City University of New York 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
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(“CUNY”) engaged in a “text-book example of gender 
and age discrimination” by denying her tenure. 
Defendants move for summary judgment. Peterson 
moves, on the basis of defendants’ alleged failures in 
discovery, to preclude defendants from offering any 
defense to her claims of discrimination and for sanctions. 
  
In support of her broad claims of discrimination, Peterson 
offers no concrete evidence. Instead, she relies solely on 
her own, wholly conclusory affidavit. In contrast, 
defendants have come forward with substantial evidence 
to show that Peterson was denied tenure for legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons. On the record before the 
Court, a reasonable jury could only conclude that 
Peterson was denied tenure not because of her gender or 
age but for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. 
  
*677 Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment is granted and the amended complaint is 
dismissed. Peterson’s motion for sanctions is denied. 
  
 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Facts 
1. Employment Chronology 
a. Initial Appointment (1973) 
City College’s School of Architecture and Environmental 
Studies (the “SOA”) hired Peterson in 1973 as an adjunct 
professor. (Defs.Am. 56.1 Statement ¶ 2). Peterson, who 
did not have any prior teaching experience, was a 1965 
graduate of Yale University with a bachelor’s and 
master’s degree in architecture. (Id. ¶ 1; Solomon Aff.Ex. 
A at 1). Prior to teaching at City College, Peterson was 
employed by a number of architecture firms and also 
maintained her own practice. (Solomon Aff.Ex. A at 2). 
Peterson was rehired to various adjunct positions through 
the summer of 1986. 
  
 
b. Application for Tenure–Track Position (1982) 
In August 1982, Peterson applied for a full-time, 
tenure-track position at the SOA. (Defs.Am. 56.1 
Statement ¶ 3). The SOA originally advertised three 
full-time positions in the Spring of 1982:(1) “Teaching in 
Structure and technical related subjects”; (2) “Archivist 
with teaching in History & Theory of Architecture”; and 
(3) “Design studio instruction and design methodology in 
basic years.” (Solomon Aff.Ex. C). The positions were 
ranked in terms of departmental need. (Id.). For reasons 
that are not clear, however, the SOA could only fill one 
tenure-track position and one visiting full-time position. 
  
Based on the SOA’s needs, the Executive Committee, 
which was responsible for reviewing applications and 
making recommendations for appointments, decided that 
the tenure-track position should be filled by a candidate 
qualified to teach structure, and that the visiting line 
should be filled with an archivist. (Id.). Jonathan 
Ochshorn was selected by the Committee for the 
tenure-track position over Peterson and three other male 
candidates. 
  
In a letter dated July 9, 1982 to City College’s Director of 
Affirmative Action, Peterson contested Ochshorn’s 
selection, claiming that her credentials for the position 
were stronger. (Id. Ex. B). Professor John Deans, 
Chairman of the Executive Committee, explained the 
Committee’s reasons for selecting Ochshorn in a letter 
dated July 27, 1982. (Id. Ex. C). Deans explained that the 
Committee selected Ochshorn over the other candidates 
principally because he was the only candidate with a 
background in structure, who was prepared to teach 
structure classes in September 1982. Peterson was not 
prepared to teach structure in September 1982. 
Accordingly, the Committee did not recommend her 
appointment. (Id.). 
  
The Office of the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, 
however, declined to approve the appointment of 
Ochshorn as an assistant professor, ostensibly because he 
did not have a master’s degree. (Id. ¶ 9). Peterson 
contends, without any evidentiary support, that Ochshorn 
was not appointed because the SOA withdrew the 
tenure-track position as a result of her complaint. (See Pl. 
Response to Defs. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 4, 7). 
  
 
c. Application for Tenure–Track Position (1985) 
On March 11, 1985, Peterson again applied for a full-time 
tenure-track position. (Solomon Aff.Ex. D). The 
advertisement for the position stated that an applicant 
“should have experience in architectural practice and in 
teaching architectural technology and architectural 
design.” (Id. Ex. E). Peterson contends that the job 
description for this position was written specifically for 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 
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Alan Feigenberg, a younger male who was Assistant to 
the Dean at that time. (Pl. Response to Defs. 56.1 
Statement ¶ 8). Neither Peterson nor Feigenberg, 
however, was selected for the position. Ultimately, a 
woman, Megan Lawrence, was selected and appointed. 
  
When the SOA originally advertised the opening, three 
candidates applied: Feigenberg, Lawrence, and Peterson. 
The Executive Committee screened the candidates, 
interviewed them, and selected Lawrence for *678 the 
position. That selection was forwarded to the Personnel & 
Budget (“P & B”) Committee. The P & B Committee 
reconsidered the candidates, and voted to recommend 
Peterson for the job instead of Lawrence. 
  
The SOA’s then-acting Dean, Donald E. Mintz, 
determined (in a detailed letter to both committees dated 
June 17, 1985) that the P & B Committee had the right 
and responsibility to reject recommendations of the 
Executive Committee, but that its authority “would be 
exceeded by introducing a candidate not recommended by 
the Executive Committee.” (Solomon Aff.Ex. L). Dean 
Mintz decided, therefore, to disregard the P & B 
Committee’s “rejection” of Lawrence, and accepted the 
Executive Committee’s selection of Lawrence for the 
position. (Id.). 
  
On June 19, 1985, Peterson filed a grievance with City 
College’s Affirmative Action office, contesting the 
“hiring procedure” used for the 1985 position. (Id. Exs. F, 
I, J). A grievance panel was convened to investigate this 
matter and reported its conclusions in a December 4, 1985 
letter addressed to City College’s President. (Id. Ex. K). 
The panel determined that Dean Mintz’s interpretation of 
the P & B Committee’s role and responsibility was 
correct. Accordingly, the panel rejected the P & B 
Committee’s “recommendation” of Peterson for the 
position. 
  
In reaching that conclusion, the panel determined inter 
alia that all three candidates “had many years of 
experience in the department .... [and they] were all 
competent and eligible for the job.” (Id.). Indeed, the 
“administrative faculty of the school neither expressed 
strong preference for a particular candidate nor the 
opinion that one was distinctly superior in credentials.” 
(Id.). 
  
Accordingly, in a letter dated January 10, 1986, the 
SOA’s Dean, J. Max Bond Jr., notified Megan Lawrence 
that she had been selected for the position. (Id. Ex. G). 
Lawrence accepted the position in a letter dated January 
20, 1986. (Id.). 
  
On January 10, 1986, Bond offered Peterson a position as 
a non-tenure-track Assistant Professor on a substitute line 
for the remainder of the 1985–86 academic year. (Id. Ex. 
M). Peterson rejected the offer, and decided to continue in 
her adjunct position for the spring of 1986. (Id. Ex. N). 
  
 
d. Appointment to Tenure–Track Position (1986) 
Peterson was appointed to a full-time, tenure-track 
position as an Associate Professor at the SOA effective 
September 1, 1986. (Defs. Am. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 2, 19). 
Bond officially offered Peterson the position in a letter 
dated September 9, 1986. (Solomon Aff.Ex. O).1 The 
offer letter stated that the appointment was “subject to 
annual review and reappointment for one year periods 
until tenure is achieved.” (Id.). It also stated that the 
“general terms and conditions of ... employment are 
regulated by the Bylaws of the Trustees of the City 
University.” (Id.). 
  
 
2. Application for Tenure (1990–91) 
a. Tenure Criteria and Confidentiality of Proceedings 
CUNY Bylaws provide that after serving for five full 
years, an Associate Professor “shall have tenure effective 
on the first day of September following his/her 
reappointment for the sixth full year.” (Id. Ex. P). 
  
CUNY’s Statement of the Board of Higher Education on 
Academic Personnel Practice provides that tenure 
decisions “shall” be based on the following criteria: (1) 
teaching effectiveness (“clear evidence of the individual’s 
ability and diligence as a teacher”); and (2) scholarship 
and professional growth (“[e]vidence of new and creative 
work shall be sought in the candidate’s published research 
or in his instructional materials when they incorporate 
new ideas or scholarly research”). (Id. Ex. Q). In addition, 
the following factors “may be supplementary 
considerations”: (1) service to the institution; and (2) 
service to the public. (Id.). 
  
*679 Appointment committee minutes on tenure decisions 
do not reflect the contents of the discussion as to an 
applicant. CUNY’s Policy on Personnel & Budget 
Procedures, adopted by the Board of Higher Education in 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 
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the City of New York on December 18, 1967 (the 
“Max–Kahn Policy”), provides that “actions upon 
motions, and not the discussion which led to such actions, 
should be recorded, unless the P & B should order, by a 
majority vote, that the discussions be recorded.” 
(Solomon Sanctions Aff.Ex. E at ¶ B.1.a). Moreover, 
voting on such motions should be by “secret ballot.” (Id.). 
The Max–Kahn Policy further directs that discussions on 
personnel actions in P & B meetings are confidential, and 
that it is “professional misconduct for a member of a P & 
B committee to disclose the substance or even the nature 
of the discussion at the P & B meeting.” (Id. at B.2). 
  
 
b. Peterson’s Tenure Application and Denial 
Peterson applied for tenure during her fourth year (the 
1989–1990 academic year) as a full-time Associate 
Professor so that the process for her reappointment with 
tenure could be considered and completed by December 
1, 1990 (Peterson’s fifth year—the 1990–1991 academic 
year), the deadline for notification of non-reappointment. 
(Defs.Am. 56.1 Statement ¶ 21). Among the materials 
considered by the various committees in passing on the 
tenure application were Peterson’s: (1) personnel file 
(including at least three peer evaluations and one 
performance evaluation from Bond dated March 13, 
1989); (2) curriculum vitae; and (3) work portfolio. (See 
Solomon Sanctions Aff.Ex. C; Solomon Aff.Ex. V).2 
  
In the first stage of academic review for tenure, the 
Department Executive Committee votes twice on whether 
an applicant should be granted tenure. The Executive 
Committee rejected Peterson’s tenure application in its 
two votes, which took place on February 3, 1990 and May 
3, 1990. (See Defs.Am. 56.1 Statement ¶ 22; Solomon 
Aff. ¶ 24; Solomon Sanctions Aff.Ex. C; Irvine Aff. ¶ 5). 
The tally of the votes was 2–3–0–2 
(yes-no-abstain-absent) for the first vote, and 1–4–0–2 for 
the second vote. (Irvine Aff. ¶ 5). Although the minutes 
for the February 3 and May 3, 1990 meetings could not be 
found, the following five faculty members were on the 
Executive Committee for the Spring of 1990: Gordon 
Gebert (Chair), Carmi Bee, Peter Gisolfi, John Loomis, 
and Ghislaine Hermanuz. There were also two students on 
the Executive Committee for the Spring of 1990, whose 
names are not known. (Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 14). 
  
Following the established review process, Peterson 
appealed the Executive Committee’s decision to the 
SOA’s Divisional P & B Committee. Her appeal was 
granted—the SOA P & B voted in favor of granting her 
tenure—in a 4–0–1–0 vote on May 9, 1990. (Irvine Aff. ¶ 
5; Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 13). The members of the 
SOA P & B Committee who voted on Peterson’s appeal 
were Gebert, Barnett, Cordingley, Friedberg, and Ryder. 
(Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 13). 
  
In accordance with the established review process, 
Peterson’s tenure application was next considered by the 
City College Review Committee (the “Review 
Committee”), a college-wide committee. The Review 
Committee overwhelmingly rejected Peterson’s tenure 
*680 application in a 1–8–0–1 vote on June 12, 1990. The 
voting members of the Review Committee were City 
College’s Provost Robert Pfeffer and the ten Deans of the 
Schools and Divisions of the college as follows: (1) 
Leonard Beckum (Education); (2) Paul Sherwin 
(Humanities); (3) Edna Neuman (Nursing); (4) Jeffrey 
Rosen (Social Science); (5) J. Max Bond (Architecture); 
(6) Charles Watkins (Engineering); (7) Alan Fiellin 
(General Education and Guidance); (8) Virginia Red 
(Art); (9) George I. Lythcott (Medical); and (10) Michael 
Arons (Sciences). Arons was absent for the vote. (Id. ¶ 
12). 
  
On June 21, 1990 Dean Morris Silberberg of Faculty 
Relations officially notified Peterson of the Review 
Committee’s recommendation that she not be reappointed 
with tenure, and that her employment at City College 
would end on August 13, 1991. (Solomon Aff.Ex. T). In 
the meantime, again in accordance with established 
procedures, Peterson appealed the Review Committee’s 
decision to City College’s president, Bernard W. 
Harleston.3 
  
Harleston notified Peterson in a letter dated October 29, 
1990 that “[a]fter a complete and thorough review of your 
curriculum vitae and the additional materials that came to 
my attention during your appeal, it is my academic 
judgment not to disturb the negative decision of [the 
Review Committee].” (Id. Ex. U). 
  
On November 5, 1990, Peterson wrote to Harleston 
requesting an explanation for his denial of her appeal. 
Harleston responded in a letter dated November 14, 1990. 
(Id. Ex. V). He explained that in reaching his decision he 
reviewed Peterson’s “record of teaching performance, 
productive scholarship, research and publications, 
professional activity and service to the College.” (Id.). He 
concluded that Peterson’s “achievements in the areas of 
scholarly productivity, research, publication and 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 
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professional activity were not sufficient to warrant a 
tenure appointment.” (Id.). In addition, he commented 
that peer teaching evaluations raised questions as to 
Peterson’s level of technical experience and knowledge, 
level of design development, and knowledge of computer 
applications. (Id.). 
  
At the same time Peterson was appealing her tenure 
denial to Harleston, on June 19, 1990, she also filed a 
Step I Grievance as to the same issue. (See Solomon 
Sanctions Aff.Ex. C (Step I Grievance form)). Silberberg 
denied Peterson’s Step I grievance in a decision dated 
May 6, 1991. (Id. Ex. C (5/6/91 grievance decision)). 
Peterson filed a Step 2 grievance on May 9, 1991. 
Peterson later withdrew the Step 2 grievance. (Id. Ex. C 
(11/22/91 letter from University Director of Labor 
Hearings & Appeals)). 
  
 
3. Statistics 
During the last five years of Peterson’s employment at the 
SOA, it hired nine full-time, tenure-track faculty 
members. (Solomon Aff. ¶¶ 32–34 and Exs. W, X).4 Of 
those nine individuals, five (including Peterson) were 
women. Two of these women were tenured: (1) Labelle 
Prussin, who was hired with tenure (and subsequently 
resigned); and (2) Ghislaine Hermanuz, who was granted 
tenure in September 1991. 
  
Of the nine individuals hired to tenure-track 
appointments, two were older than Peterson. (Id.). When 
Hermanuz was granted tenure in 1991, she was then 49 
years old. *681 Horst Berger was granted tenure in 1989 
at the age of 63, and Alan Feigenberg was granted tenure 
in 1991 at the age of 47. 
  
 
B. Prior Proceedings 
1. Melani v. Board of Higher Education of the City of 
New York, No. 73 Civ. 5434(LPG) 
Melani was a class action against CUNY brought on 
behalf of female employees who alleged discrimination 
based on gender. The case was settled by a consent decree 
that became effective on September 10, 1984. The 
consent decree resolved “in full all claims against the 
defendant by the named plaintiffs and class members .... 
for damages, back pay, benefits, injunctive, declaratory or 
any other relief for the alleged unlawful discrimination, 
past and present, up to and including the effective date of 
th[e] Decree.” (Id. Ex. Y). Peterson was a member of that 
class and is bound by that decree. (See Defs.Am. 56.1 
Statement ¶¶ 32–35; Solomon Aff.Exs. Z, AA, BB, CC; 
Am.Cmplt. ¶¶ 1, 19, 26, 28). 
  
Indeed, pursuant to the Melani consent decree, Peterson 
filed a “Claim Form for Subclass III Members” on 
January 12, 1985, in which she made “a verified claim of 
sex discrimination in denial of full-time employment on 
the instruction staff of [CUNY] on or after December 21, 
1970 and up to September 10, 1984.” (Solomon Aff.Ex. 
Z). Because no full-time appointments were made in 
Peterson’s discipline during the relevant period, her claim 
was denied on October 29, 1985. (Id. Ex. AA). Peterson 
appealed on December 17, 1985. (Id. Ex. BB). In 
exchange for $1,750, however, Peterson agreed to 
withdraw her appeal on May 6, 1986. (Id. CC).5 
  
 
2. Prior Discrimination Charges 
Other than the claim in Melani, Peterson never filed any 
formal charges of discrimination against defendants 
concerning events that occurred prior to her full-time, 
tenure-track appointment in 1986. (Defs.Am. 56.1 
Statement ¶ 18). 
  
As to the denial of tenure, however, Peterson did file a 
charge of discrimination with the New York State 
Division of Human Rights and the EEOC on February 21, 
1991. In that charge, Peterson alleged that she was denied 
tenure “because of my sex (Female) and because of my 
age (53) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 ... and in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967.” (Solomon Aff.Ex. DD). 
  
In a determination dated July 30, 1992, the EEOC held 
that defendants’ “hiring and tenure appointments failed to 
show any disparate treatment of persons based upon sex,” 
and that “the evidence obtained during the investigation 
does not establish a violation of [Title VII].” (Id. Ex. EE). 
The EEOC noted that during the course of Peterson’s 
tenure-track employment at the SOA, the SOA hired nine 
full-time faculty on tenure lines, five of whom (including 
Peterson) were females. (Id.). In addition, in the prior five 
years, the SOA had granted tenure to more females than 
males. 
  
Accordingly, the EEOC dismissed Peterson’s complaint, 
at the same time giving her the right to sue in federal 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 
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court. (Id.). 
  
 
3. The Instant Case 
Peterson, pro se, commenced suit by filing a complaint on 
October 29, 1992. The case was originally assigned to 
Judge Louis J. Freeh, but was reassigned to Judge Robert 
P. Patterson on August 19, 1993. Peterson subsequently 
obtained counsel (who agreed to take on the case at the 
request of the Court), and an amended complaint was 
filed on September 6, 1994. Peterson moved to compel 
the production of documents, which *682 was granted in 
part and denied in part in a decision dated November 18, 
1994. 
  
Thereafter, the case was reassigned to me. On July 21, 
1995, Peterson moved for a contempt order and for 
sanctions alleging that defendants had failed to produce 
documents that were the subject of their previous motion 
to compel. In an order dated March 18, 1996, I denied that 
motion. In a conference with the parties on April 18, 
1997, I set a final discovery deadline of September 12, 
1997. 
  
These motions followed. 
  
 
C. The Parties’ Allegations 
1. Plaintiff 
Peterson alleges that the treatment she received by 
defendants was a “text-book example of gender and age 
discrimination, which worsened constantly and which was 
increased in retaliation for her successful pursuit of relief 
in a class action against defendants for gender bias.” 
(Am.Cmplt.¶ 1). She does not set forth separate causes of 
action in her amended complaint, but asserts that 
jurisdiction is based on both Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e–5, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(the “ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5). Thus, the 
amended complaint asserts claims for gender and age 
discrimination as well as retaliation. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 32; see also 
Peterson Aff. ¶¶ 14, 49; Pl. Response to Defs. 56.1 
Statement ¶ 108; Pl.Mem. at 14–15). 
  
It is unclear for what time period Peterson seeks relief. 
The amended complaint alleges discrimination as to 
defendants’ 1982 and 1985 decisions not to select 
Peterson for a tenure-track position. In the prayer for 
relief, however, Peterson only seeks back pay to 
September 1991, when her employment with defendants 
ceased. (See also Pl.Mem. at 16 (apparently conceding 
that she is not entitled to relief for conduct prior to 1986, 
Peterson contends that the Court has jurisdiction to grant 
her relief “for defendants’ discriminatory acts from the 
time she was appointed to a tenure-track position”). 
  
 
2. Defendants 
Defendants contend that any discrimination claim based 
on actions that occurred prior to April 26, 1990 are time 
barred. (Defs.Mem. at 9–12). Defendants also contend 
that claims for acts prior to April 26, 1990 were not the 
subject of Peterson’s EEOC charge, and are therefore 
jurisdictionally barred. (Id. at 12–14). Even assuming 
Peterson’s claims concerning conduct that occurred prior 
to September 1984 are not defective, defendants contend 
that claims based on events during this time period are 
barred based on the Melani consent decree. (Id. at 15–17). 
Finally, defendants contend that, regardless of the Court’s 
rulings concerning jurisdiction and the statute of 
limitations, Peterson’s amended complaint must be 
dismissed on the merits. (Id. at 17–26). 
  
Any claims based on events pre-dating the Melani decree 
are barred, as Peterson was a member of the class. 
Otherwise, however, solely for purposes of this motion, I 
assume that there are no viable statute of limitations 
and/or jurisdictional defenses to Peterson’s claims. Thus, 
with respect to the events post-dating the Melani decree, I 
address only defendants’ contention that summary 
judgment dismissing the amended complaint should be 
granted on the merits. I also assume, without deciding the 
issue, that Peterson would be entitled to rely on the 1982 
and 1985 decisions at least as background evidence to 
support her claims of discrimination as to the denial of 
tenure. 
  
 
DISCUSSION 
A. Legal Standards 
1. Summary Judgment 
The standards governing motions for summary judgment 
are well-settled. Summary judgment may be granted when 
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“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87, 106 S.Ct. 
1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Accordingly, the Court’s 
task is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth 
of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue *683 for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To 
create an issue for trial, there must be sufficient evidence 
in the record supporting a jury verdict in the nonmoving 
party’s favor. See id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. 
  
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, however, the 
nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that 
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 
Matsushita, 475 U .S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The 
nonmoving party may not rest upon mere “conclusory 
allegations or denials,” but must set forth “concrete 
particulars” showing that a trial is needed. National Union 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Deloach, 708 F.Supp. 1371, 1379 
(S.D.N.Y.1989) (quoting R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & 
Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir.1984)). 
  
 
2. Title VII & ADEA Burdens of Proof 
[1] The “ultimate issue” in an employment discrimination 
case is whether the plaintiff has met her burden of proving 
that the adverse employment decision was motivated at 
least in part by an “impermissible reason,” that is, that 
there was discriminatory intent. Fields v. New York State 
Office of Mental Retardation and Dev. Disabilities, 115 
F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir.1997); see St. Mary’s Honor Center 
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 
407 (1993); Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 
1336 (2d Cir.1997) (en banc ), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
1075, 118 S.Ct. 851, 139 L.Ed.2d 752 (1998). Plaintiffs 
have generally sought to meet that burden by using a 
“mixed-motives” analysis, see de la Cruz v. New York 
City Human Resources Admin. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 82 
F.3d 16, 23 (2d Cir.1996); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
958 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826, 
113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992), or by proving 
“pretext” under the three-part test first enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in McDonnell–Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), 
see Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 
U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); de la 
Cruz, 82 F.3d at 20. 
  
As articulated in recent years, the three-step 
McDonnell–Douglas test theoretically operates as 
follows. First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case 
of unlawful discrimination by showing that (1) he or she 
is a member of a protected class (2) who was qualified for 
his or her position (3) who suffered an adverse 
employment action (4) under circumstances giving rise to 
an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell–Douglas, 
411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Shumway v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir.1997). Second, 
if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a rebuttable 
presumption of discrimination arises and the burden then 
“shifts” to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. 
See Stratton v. Dep’t for the Aging for the City of New 
York, 132 F.3d 869, 879 (2d Cir.1997); Fisher, 114 F.3d 
at 1335–36. Third, if the defendant articulates a 
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the presumption 
of discrimination is rebutted and it “simply drops out of 
the picture.” St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 510–11, 113 S.Ct. 
2742. The plaintiff must then show, without the benefit of 
any presumptions, that it is more likely than not that the 
employer’s decision was motivated at least in part by a 
discriminatory reason. Because the defendant has at this 
point offered a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, 
the plaintiff must show that the proffered reason is in 
reality a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See Fisher, 
114 F.3d at 1337. 
  
Although the McDonnell–Douglas framework has been 
with us for some twenty-five years, it has proven at times 
to be confusing and unworkable. See, e.g., Norton v. 
Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 1001, 119 S.Ct. 511, 142 L.Ed.2d 424 (1998) 
(describing cases interpreting McDonnell Douglas as a 
“thick accretion” that “should not obscure the simple 
principle that” the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of 
persuasion in discrimination cases); Greenway v. Buffalo 
Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir.1998) (commenting 
that requiring juries to “play the ping-pong-like match of 
shifting burdens is confusing”). For this reason, I believe 
that the McDonnell–Douglas test has outlived its 
usefulness *684 and should be discarded. Instead, courts 
should focus on the “ultimate issue”—whether the 
plaintiff has proven that it is more likely than not that the 
employer’s decision was motivated at least in part by an 
“impermissible,” or discriminatory, reason. See generally 
Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell 
Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in 
Discrimination Cases, 64 Brook.L.Rev. 659 (1998); 
Lapsley v. Columbia Univ., 999 F.Supp. 506, 513–16 
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(S.D.N.Y.1998). 
  
In the summary judgment context, a more direct approach 
would refocus attention on what should be the central 
inquiry: the evidence, or lack of evidence, of 
discrimination in a particular case. In considering a 
summary judgment motion, courts should address the 
ultimate issue by examining whether the plaintiff has 
presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury 
to conclude that a defendant’s decisions were motivated at 
least in part by an impermissible reason. See Fisher, 114 
F.3d at 1347. The court should conduct this inquiry in the 
following manner: first, by evaluating plaintiff’s proof, 
direct or otherwise, of discrimination; second, by 
evaluating defendant’s proof that it did not discriminate, 
including evidence of defendant’s explanations for its 
decisions; and third, by considering the evidence as a 
whole, resolving all conflicts in the proof and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. 
  
In considering the ultimate issue, a factfinder at trial or a 
court considering a motion for summary judgment must 
bear two concepts in mind. First, the issue is intentional 
discrimination—the plaintiff has the burden at all times of 
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or 
she was the victim of intentional discrimination. See St. 
Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (stating that the 
“ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff 
remains at all times with the plaintiff”) (quoting Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089)). It is not enough that the 
plaintiff was unfairly treated or that a defendant’s stated 
reasons for its employment actions are proven to be 
pretextual. Rather, while unfair treatment and a 
defendant’s false statements may constitute “pieces of 
circumstantial evidence” that support a claim of 
intentional discrimination, the evidence as a whole must 
be sufficient to sustain an “ultimate finding” of intentional 
discrimination. Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1338. 
  
Second, at the same time, proof of intentional 
discrimination is often elusive. Because an employer’s 
“intent and state of mind are implicated,” Meiri v. Dacon, 
759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 
106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985), “direct, smoking gun, 
evidence of discrimination” is rarely available. Richards 
v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 668 F.Supp. 259, 265 
(S.D.N.Y.1987), aff’d, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir.1988). 
Courts must continue to be mindful that “ ‘clever men 
may easily conceal their motivations.’ ” Robinson v. 12 
Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir.1979) 
(quoting United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 
1179, 1185 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042, 
95 S.Ct. 2656, 45 L.Ed.2d 694 (1975)); accord Ramseur 
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d 
Cir.1989); see also Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1187 (“[If] there is 
at the very least a thick cloud of smoke,” an employer 
must “convince the factfinder that, despite the smoke, 
there is no fire.”) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228, 266, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 
(1989)). All a plaintiff need do is persuade a finder of 
fact, from all the evidence in the record, that it is more 
likely than not that the adverse employment decision was 
motivated at least in part by an impermissible reason. 
  
 
3. Tenure Denial 
The Second Circuit has “repeatedly noted that tenure 
decisions involve unique factors that set them apart from 
other employment decisions.” Batra v. Pace Univ., No. 90 
Civ. 4315, 1998 WL 684621, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.30, 
1998) (citing Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 
1434–35 (2d Cir.1995), reh’g en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d 
Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118 S.Ct. 851, 139 
L.Ed.2d 752 (1998); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 
85, 92 (2d Cir.1984); Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d 
Cir.1980)). Because tenure decisions “involve a myriad of 
considerations and are made by numerous *685 
individuals and committees over a lengthy period of time, 
a plaintiff ‘faces an uphill battle in her efforts to prove 
discrimination ... in the refusal to grant her tenure.’ ” Id. 
(quoting Kawatra v. Medgar Evers College, No. 86 
Civ.1946, 1997 WL 722703, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.25, 
1997)). 
  
[2] Thus, even though tenure decisions are not immune 
from review under Title VII or the ADEA, a court 
“should exercise caution in second-guessing a tenure 
decision and should not ‘sit as a super tenure-review 
committee.’ ” Id. (quoting Negussey v. Syracuse Univ., 
No. 95 Civ. 1827, 1997 WL 141679, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. 
Mar.24, 1997)); see also Jalal v. Columbia Univ., 4 
F.Supp.2d 224, 235 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“judges are 
frequently admonished not to second-guess the merits of a 
university’s collective academic judgment as to a tenure 
candidate’s qualifications”) (citations omitted). 
  
 
B. Application 
[3] Because the McDonnell–Douglas test remains 
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governing law, I am bound to apply it. Rather than do so 
formalistically, however, I assume that Peterson has made 
out a prima facie case. Defendants have articulated 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their 
action—Peterson was denied tenure because, in the 
estimation of defendants’ Executive Committee, Review 
Committee, and President, she failed to meet the required 
academic criteria. Hence, I proceed directly to the 
ultimate question: whether Peterson has presented 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
find discrimination. I do so by reviewing first plaintiff’s 
evidence, then defendants’ evidence, and finally the 
record as a whole. 
  
 
1. Plaintiff’s Evidence 
Peterson’s evidence of discrimination is extremely thin. 
She provides no documents, no quantifiable statistics, no 
statements, no depositions, and no affidavits other than 
her own conclusory affidavit, consisting primarily of 
speculation. She points to no circumstances, such as 
unexplained adverse treatment, that could give rise to an 
inference of intent to discriminate. Construing the facts in 
the light most favorable to her, and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in her favor, there are three broad categories of 
circumstantial evidence that Peterson contends support 
her discrimination claims: (1) her credentials are stronger 
than those of her peers/colleagues; (2) there were 
irregularities in the tenure review process; and (3) there is 
a “pattern” of purportedly discriminatory treatment by 
defendants against both women and older people. I 
discuss each of these categories in turn. 
  
 
a. Peterson’s Credentials 
Peterson repeatedly alleges that her qualifications, work 
performance, professional experience, and service to the 
SOA exceeded those of her colleagues. 
  
First, Peterson alleges that she was more qualified than 
Jonathan Ochshorn (a younger man) for a full-time, 
tenure-track position in 1982. Yet, defendants 
recommended Ochshorn for the position over her. 
Second, Peterson alleges that she was the most qualified 
candidate for the 1985 tenure-track position, to which she 
was not appointed. Both the younger female candidate, 
who was selected and appointed, and the younger male 
candidate, who was not selected, are alleged to have been 
less qualified than Peterson for the position. Third, 
Peterson alleges that the younger female who was granted 
tenure the year that Peterson was denied tenure is less 
qualified than Peterson. Finally, Peterson also alleges that 
she carried a heavier courseload and was more involved 
in SOA activities than her colleagues. 
  
All of these allegations are debatable. Evidence in the 
record establishes, as least with respect to Megan 
Lawrence, Alan Feigenberg, Horst Berger, and Ghislaine 
Hermanuz, that these individuals are or were 
distinguished scholars and candidates in their own right. 
(See Kramer Aff. Exs. 1–6; Solomon Aff. Ex. K). 
  
Nonetheless, I assume for purposes of this motion that 
Peterson’s allegations concerning her superior credentials 
are true. Even if true, however, these allegations do not, 
by themselves, prove discrimination. Even assuming, for 
example, that Ochshorn was an “inferior” candidate 
because he did not have  *686 a master’s degree, he had 
experience in “structure” and was ready to teach structure, 
whereas Peterson had no such experience and could not 
have taught the course. Hence, the fact that defendants 
initially chose Ochshorn over Peterson is hardly proof of 
discrimination. 
  
 
b. Irregularity in Process 
Peterson next contends that defendants’ tenure decision 
was flawed due to a number of “irregularities” in the 
process. For instance, Peterson’s personnel file does not 
contain the requisite number of evaluations. In addition, 
Peterson disagrees with Professor David Guise’s peer 
evaluation, which was considered by defendants in 
denying tenure. Guise’s evaluation stated inter alia that 
“every single drawing I viewed ... which were secured on 
the wall, contained major errors.” (Solomon Aff. Ex. R 
(emphasis in original)). Peterson contends that Guise was 
“biased” against her. 
  
In addition, Peterson alleges that the Executive 
Committee (that twice voted against her tenure 
application) was not properly staffed. She notes that two 
members of the Committee had to remove themselves 
because they were not tenured at the time (John Loomis 
and Ghislaine Hermanuz). (Peterson Aff. ¶ 41). She also 
alleges that “[f]or the only time in the Executive 
Committee’s history, two students were improperly 
permitted to vote on my tenure review.” (Id.). As to the 
Review Committee’s nearly unanimous decision against 
tenure, Peterson alleges that the Review Committee 
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“ignor[ed]” the SOA’s review process and that she “has 
no idea which members of defendants’ Review 
Committee voted on [her] tenure or whether even a proper 
vote was taken.” (Id. ¶ 44). 
  
At best, these contentions are also debatable for a number 
of reasons. First, while it is true that Peterson’s personnel 
file contained less than the required number of 
evaluations, Peterson does not contend that she ever 
complained about the scheduling of annual evaluations 
and/or teaching observations. (See supra note 2). Rather, 
she maintains that additional evaluations of her 
performance exist, but that defendants have improperly 
withheld these documents from her. As will be discussed 
more fully below, I do not find that defendants have 
withheld documents from Peterson. 
  
Second, there is no evidence to support the contention that 
Guise’s critical evaluation of Peterson was somehow 
tainted because he was “biased” against her. Even if it 
were true that Guise was “biased” against Peterson, there 
is no allegation that Guise was biased against Peterson 
because of her gender or age. Moreover, he later wrote 
unsolicited letters supporting her tenure application. 
Gebert’s Chairman’s Report, in which he recommends 
Peterson for tenure, states that “[p]eer observations ... are 
not uniformly positive, though one evaluator [presumably 
Guise] later felt it prudent to moderate his negative 
remarks in several unsolicited letters.” (Kramer Aff. Ex. 
7). In addition, Guise’s evaluation was not the only 
evaluation considered. Other peer evaluations of Peterson 
also contained negative comments. (See Solomon Aff. 
Exs. S, V). 
  
Finally, even if there are questions concerning the 
members of the Executive Committee who voted on her 
tenure application, there is not a scintilla of evidence to 
suggest that the proper process concerning Peterson’s 
tenure application was ignored. There is also no evidence 
whatsoever to suggest that the Review Committee’s vote 
was somehow improper. (See Solomon Aff. Exs. V, X, 
EE; Irvine Aff.; Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 12 and Ex. C). 
  
Accordingly, Peterson has at best demonstrated that there 
were some minor irregularities as to her tenure review. 
Even so, however, there is nothing in the record to even 
remotely suggest that these “irregularities” were 
motivated by discriminatory animus against Peterson on 
the basis of her gender and/or her age. 
  
 
c. Pattern of Discrimination 
To support her sweeping claims of discrimination, 
Peterson repeatedly alleges that defendants engaged in a 
pattern of discriminatory conduct on the basis of both 
gender and age. Peterson, however, provides absolutely 
*687 no concrete evidence—direct or indirect—to support 
these wholly conclusory allegations. 
  
For instance, Peterson alleges that Megan Lawrence was 
selected and appointed to a tenure-track position over 
Peterson, in 1985, “because [defendants] were under 
pressure to hire a woman, but knew that [Lawrence] 
would be unable to assume the position” because she was 
“dying from cancer.” (Peterson Aff. ¶¶ 20–22). Although 
it is true that Lawrence passed away after her appointment 
(see Solomon Aff. Ex. W), there is not a shred of proof in 
the record to substantiate this conclusory speculation as to 
why defendants hired Lawrence or even that defendants 
knew Lawrence was sick. Peterson does not identify any 
source of information as to this contention, nor does she 
contend that she had personal knowledge of the alleged 
circumstances surrounding Lawrence’s appointment. The 
suggestion that defendants hired Lawrence precisely 
because they knew that she was going to die is absurd. 
  
Another glaring example of Peterson’s lack of concrete 
evidence as to purported discrimination is her contention 
concerning Labelle Prussin, a woman who is older than 
Peterson and who was hired with tenure in 1986. Peterson 
contends that Prussin resigned in 1990 “because of the 
repeatedly bad treatment she received [at the SOA] 
because of her gender.” (Peterson Aff. ¶ 46). Peterson 
also alleges that Prussin attempted to rescind her 
resignation but the SOA refused to let her rescind it, so 
“she was forced out.” (Id.). 
  
Again, Peterson does not offer a single bit of evidence to 
support this speculation. She does not offer an affidavit 
from Prussin or any other member of the faculty familiar 
with the alleged events in question. She does not explain 
how she purportedly knew this information concerning 
Prussin. She does not identify a single source of 
information. Finally, she does not identify any of the 
parties involved in the “repeatedly bad treatment” or even 
what the treatment was or how it was related to Prussin’s 
gender. 
  
In short, Peterson has utterly failed to present evidence of 
discrimination or any pattern of discriminatory conduct. 
Although she speculates that every action affecting her 
was based on discriminatory animus, she offers nothing 
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substantive to prove it. Indeed, statistics and other 
evidence in the record demonstrate no pattern of 
discriminatory conduct by defendants on the basis of 
gender and/or age. 
  
 
2. Defendants’ Evidence 
Defendants rely on evidence tending to show that 
Peterson was denied tenure for legitimate 
non-discriminatory reasons. That evidence is substantial. 
  
For instance, Harleston, upon reviewing the entire record 
concerning Peterson’s tenure application, concluded that 
Peterson’s: 
overall record does not provide 
evidence of a potential for 
performance at a level that I would 
expect of faculty members in the 
School of Architecture being 
considered for tenure at th[e] time. 
It was my academic judgment that 
[Peterson’s] achievements in the 
areas of scholarly productivity, 
research, publication and 
professional activity were not 
sufficient to warrant a tenure 
appointment. During the past five 
year period [Peterson’s] record of 
professional accomplishments, 
publications, and/or research 
activities have been extremely 
limited in quantity and importance. 
There has been no direct 
contribution to the professional 
literature. I found [therefore] that 
[Peterson’s] work in these areas did 
not constitute a body of 
accomplishments that would add to 
[Peterson’s] status in the profession 
or would contribute to the future 
growth and instructional needs of 
the [SOA]. 
(Solomon Aff. Ex. V). 
  
Gebert, who recommended that Peterson be reappointed 
with tenure, conceded the following in his “Chairman’s 
Report” that was considered by the Review Committee 
and Harleston: 
Peterson’s professional activities 
have decreased substantially in the 
time since she obtained a full-time 
position in the School.... The 
Departmental Executive Committee 
[of which Gebert was a member] 
voiced a great deal of concern 
regarding Prof. Peterson’s 
diminished accomplishments in the 
areas of professional *688 work 
and scholarship as well as her 
effectiveness as a teacher in the 
past several years. The [P & B] 
Committee [of which Gebert was 
also a member] devoted less 
discussion to this issue, wishing 
instead to emphasize Prof. 
Peterson’s length of service. The 
question remains: Is Prof. 
Peterson’s relatively attenuated 
professional development in the 
past several years a relatively 
short-lived aberration or a 
long-term downward trend? 
(Kramer Aff. Ex. 7). 
  
Countless other exhibits in this case demonstrate that 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons existed to justify 
Peterson’s denial of tenure. (See Solomon Aff. Exs. A at 
10, Q, R, S, V). Moreover, despite Peterson’s emphasis 
on her service to the SOA, she does not dispute the fact 
that the primary criteria for tenure decisions were 
teaching effectiveness and scholarship and professional 
growth. (See Solomon Aff. Ex. Q). Factors such as 
service to the institution and service to the public are only 
“supplementary considerations.” (Id.). Noticeably absent 
from Peterson’s contentions regarding her superior 
qualifications is any allegation as to her accomplishments 
in the area of scholarly work, particularly academic 
publication. 
  
In short, defendants’ evidence of legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for denying tenure is 
compelling. 
  
 
3. The Record as a Whole 
In the end, Peterson’s “evidence” of gender and/or age 
discrimination is virtually non-existent. Even assuming 
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that she was more qualified than her colleagues and that 
there were some minor irregularities in her tenure review, 
no rational jury could conclude, on the basis of the record 
as a whole, that she was discriminated against because of 
her gender and/or her age. Simply put, Peterson has not 
come forward with sufficient evidence to raise an issue of 
fact for trial. 
  
Peterson contends in her opposition that “[t]here is 
adequate evidence in the record to show, at minimum, a 
genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Ms. Peterson’s 
purported failure to have sufficient scholarly works or 
professional accomplishments were the true reason 
defendants’ denied her tenure ... and that they were 
motivated at least in part by discriminatory animus.” 
(Pl.Mem. at 14). While Peterson conclusorily alleges the 
existence of “adequate evidence in the record” to raise an 
issue of fact, she utterly fails to point to any such 
evidence.6 
  
Moreover, Peterson’s conclusory, unsupported allegations 
of discrimination are countered by defendants’ concrete 
and specific proof that its conduct was legitimate and 
lawful. See Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 
109–10 (2d Cir.1994) (“some evidence is not sufficient to 
withstand a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment; a plaintiff opposing such a motion must 
produce sufficient evidence to support a rational finding 
that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered 
by the employer were false, and that more likely than not 
the [alleged unlawful reason] was the real reason for the 
[employment decision]”). 
  
To merit a trial on Peterson’s claims, the evidence must 
show that, more likely than not, defendants’ “proffered 
reason was not the true reason for the employment 
decision.” Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1336 
(2d Cir.1997) (en banc ), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118 
S.Ct. 851, 139 L.Ed.2d 752 (1998) (quoting St. Mary’s, 
509 U.S. 502, 507–08, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 
(1993)). There is no evidence to suggest that defendants’ 
proffered reason for denying tenure was not the true 
reason tenure was denied. Although Peterson has arguably 
presented some evidence of pretext (i.e., superior 
qualifications and minor irregularities in the tenure 
process), it is undermined by the evidence that defendants 
have submitted. Even assuming that a reasonable jury 
could find pretext, no reasonable jury could conclude that 
the pretext was a mask for illegal discrimination. 
  
*689 In sum, Peterson’s tenure application was carefully 
considered by individuals who were, for the most part, 
intimately familiar with her qualifications and the needs 
of the institution. These individuals were, for the most 
part, eminently qualified to judge such issues as the 
scholarliness of Peterson’s work and the strength of her 
contributions to her field of study. These individuals 
participated in four separate levels of review and 
deliberation. Yet, Peterson now wants this Court to step in 
and provide her with a fifth level of review and to 
“second-guess” the tenure decision. While the Court 
would not hesitate to do so were there concrete and 
specific evidence of discrimination, no such evidence has 
been presented in this case. Accordingly, there is no basis 
upon which to disturb defendants’ decision to deny tenure 
here, and no reasonable jury could conclude that Peterson 
was denied tenure for a discriminatory reason. 
  
 
4. Rule 56(f) 
[4] Although Peterson does not explicitly invoke 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) in opposing defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, the contentions she makes in 
opposition (and in her motion for sanctions) implicitly 
raise the issue as to whether she has been afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery. 
  
On the record before me, I conclude that Peterson has 
been afforded a full and fair opportunity to conduct 
discovery in this case. Cf. Meloff v. New York Life Ins. 
Co., 51 F.3d 372 374–76 (2d Cir.1995) (vacating 
summary judgment where plaintiff demonstrated a lack of 
opportunity to conduct discovery). Indeed, Peterson had 
some five years in which to conduct discovery. Although 
she continues to complain that defendants have failed to 
produce requested documents, I find that defendants have 
substantially complied with their obligations in discovery. 
Indeed, defendants made approximately ten boxes of 
documents available for Peterson to inspect (culled from 
approximately 60 boxes of archived files), but she chose 
to inspect only one of the ten boxes. Moreover, Peterson 
cannot be heard to complain in this respect because the 
record does not reflect that she conducted any 
depositions. 
  
Accordingly, to the extent that Peterson’s opposition 
suggests that she has not had a full and fair opportunity to 
conduct discovery, the argument is rejected. 
  
For all the reasons stated above, defendants are entitled to 
summary judgment dismissing Peterson’s discrimination 
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claims. 
  
 
C. Retaliation 
[5] Peterson also alleges that she was denied tenure “in 
retaliation for her successful pursuit for relief in a class 
action against defendants for gender bias” and in 
retaliation for “protesting discrimination” based on gender 
and/or age. (Am.Cmplt.¶¶ 1, 32). To prevail on a claim of 
retaliation, Peterson must demonstrate that: (1) she was 
engaged in protected activity; (2) defendants were aware 
of the activity; (3) defendants took some adverse 
employment action against her; and (4) a causal 
connection exists between her participation in a protected 
activity and the adverse employment action. See Lapsley 
v. Columbia Univ., 999 F.Supp. 506, 524 (S.D.N.Y.1998) 
(citing Galdieri–Ambrosini v. National Realty and Dev. 
Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d Cir.1998)). 
  
[6] Construing the amended complaint in the light most 
favorable to Peterson, she has alleged protected activity in 
this case by noting her participation in the Melani case as 
well as other alleged conduct to “protest[ ] 
discrimination.” (Am.Cmplt.¶ 32). She also alleges 
causation, as she contends that she was denied tenure in 
retaliation for her protected activity. 
  
These allegations, however, are purely conclusory with no 
concrete support. Just as there is no support for her 
discrimination claims, there is no support for her claim of 
retaliation. In the face of defendants’ concrete showing 
that they denied Peterson tenure for legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reasons, no reasonable juror could 
conclude that the tenure decision was retaliatory. 
Accordingly, the claim for retaliation is dismissed as well. 
  
 
D. Plaintiff’s Motion 
[7] Upon review and consideration of Peterson’s motion 
for sanctions (and to preclude *690 defendants from 
offering a defense), the Court finds no basis upon which 
to grant the relief requested. 
  
Peterson first moved to compel production of documents 
in September 1994. That motion was granted in part and 
denied in part by Judge Patterson in a memorandum 
decision dated November 15, 1994. (Feldmesser 
Sanctions Aff. Ex. B). A year and a half later, after the 
case was reassigned to me, Peterson moved for sanctions 
and fees alleging that defendants failed to comply with 
the November 1994 decision ordering production. 
  
In an order dated March 14, 1996, I denied the motion “in 
all respects.” I determined that there was a delay in the 
production of documents in part because of difficulties in 
negotiating and executing a confidentiality agreement. 
Even though those difficulties appeared to have been 
resolved at a conference before Judge Patterson on 
February 17, 1995, “counsel continued to bicker about the 
terms of the confidentiality agreement.” (See 3/14/96 
Order at 1). In view of the circumstances, I found that 
defendants did not act contemptuously. (Id. at 2). I denied 
Peterson’s fee request as did Judge Patterson when 
Peterson originally moved to compel documents in 1994. 
  
On April 18, 1997, I held a status conference. At the 
conference, Peterson’s counsel presented a chart 
containing specific documents that they wanted 
defendants to produce. (Feldmesser Sanctions Aff. Ex. C). 
I ordered defendants to produce the documents identified 
in the chart by June 2, 1997. I also order that all discovery 
in this case be completed by September 12, 1997. 
  
In connection with Peterson’s current sanctions motion, 
defendants represent that “all of the documents requested 
by plaintiff have been the subject of a diligent search of 
CUNY Central Office and City College files. All that 
were located were either produced directly to plaintiff or 
produced for inspection.” (Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 2 
and Ex. B; Feldmesser Sanctions Aff. Ex. D). Defendants 
deny that they have destroyed documents or have refused 
to produce documents. (Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 2). I 
accept these representations. Not only have defendants 
provided proof that they have complied with Peterson’s 
production requests in this case, again, it appears that 
Peterson has not even examined all of the documents that 
were made available to her by defendants. (See Solomon 
Sanctions Aff. ¶¶ 4–15; Kramer Sanctions Aff. ¶¶ 9–11). 
  
Accordingly, the request for sanctions is denied. The 
motion to preclude defendants from asserting a defense in 
this case, in any event, is moot. 
  
 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants’ motion is granted and the amended 
complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the 
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Court shall enter judgment accordingly. Plaintiff’s motion 
is denied. 
  
SO ORDERED. 
  
All Citations 
32 F.Supp.2d 675, 84 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 165, 
132 Ed. Law Rep. 321 
 
Footnotes 
 
1 
 
It is not clear whether Peterson specifically applied for this position. Bond’s letter implies, however, that some formal 
selection process was undertaken because it states that he had “accepted the recommendation of the Executive and 
[P & B] Committees ... and [was] offering [Peterson] appointment....” (Solomon Aff.Ex. O). 
 
2 
 
Peterson should have been, but was not, officially evaluated every year by the Chairman of the Executive Committee. 
(See Solomon Sanctions Aff.Ex. D art. 18.3(a)). But if an annual evaluation is not scheduled accordingly, it is the 
employee’s responsibility to file an observation/conference form. (Id. art. 18.3(c)). Failure by an employee to file such a 
form bars the employee from complaining about any failure to schedule an annual evaluation appointment. There is no 
evidence that Peterson ever complied with this requirement. As to peer evaluations, observations for an entire class 
period are supposed to occur at least once during each academic semester. (Id. art. 18.2(b)). Again, it is the 
employee’s responsibility to file an observation/conference form if the evaluations are not scheduled accordingly, and 
an employee may not subsequently complain concerning this requirement if she fails to file such form. (Id. art. 18.2(d)). 
Peterson’s personnel file contains five teaching observation reports for the period after her tenure-track appointment, 
about one-half of the required number. (Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 7). There is no evidence that Peterson ever filed an 
observation/conference form with respect to teaching observations. 
 
3 
 
Silberberg, in a memorandum dated October 24, 1990 to Harleston, laid out the pertinent facts concerning Peterson 
and “prepared copies of pertinent documents taken from Peterson’s personnel file” to help Harleston “review her 
appeal.” (See Solomon Sanctions Aff.Ex. C (10/24/90 memo)). Silberberg commented that the Peterson case is 
“complicated by the fact that she worked as an adjunct for many years,” and that such long service would “work against 
us in the grievance process.” (Id.). Moreover, only one annual evaluation during her tenure-track appointment was 
prepared by Dean Bond in the spring of 1989. (Id.). Finally, Silberberg commented that Peterson’s personnel file 
contained only about half the required number of peer classroom evaluations. (Id.). 
 
4 
 
The individuals hired are as follows: (1) Horst Berger (male; DOB 6/28; hired 9/90); (2) Jerrilyn Dodds (female; DOB 
2/51; hired 9/90); (3) Alan Feigenberg (male; DOB 4/44; hired 9/88); (4) Ghislaine Hermanuz (female; DOB 4/42; hired 
9/86); (5) Megan Lawrence (female; deceased); (6) John Loomis (male; DOB 8/51; hired 9/88); (7) Cynthia Peterson 
(female; DOB 3/37; hired 9/86); (8) Labelle Prussin (female; DOB 1/29; hired with tenure 2/87; resigned); and (9) 
Leland Weintraub (male; DOB 11/51; hired 9/89). 
 
5 
 
Peterson contends that the withdrawal of her appeal “was moot, null and void because I was about to receive a 
full-time tenure track position through other means .... [and that she does not remember receiving] any funds or relief 
under the Melanie [sic] consent decree.” (Peterson Aff. ¶ 25; see also Peterson Mem. at 2–3). It is not clear what 
Peterson is attempting to establish by making this contention. There is no question that she was a member of the 
Melani class. Thus, Peterson is not entitled to relief in this case based on any claim of discrimination for conduct that 
pre-dates September 10, 1984. 
 
6 
 
It is telling that in her 56.1 Statement, Peterson cites only to her own affidavit, with the exception of four citations to 
defendants’ exhibits (including, exhibits concerning Lawrence’s appointment (Exs.K, L); CUNY’s tenure policy (Ex. Q); 
and one peer evaluation containing a positive remark about Peterson (Ex. S)). 
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